

The Pathways to Achieve the African Agenda 2063 Goals: Resilient Institutions

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ABSTRACT: This paper asserts that the political, economic, and social institutions (PESIs) are the necessary institutional pathways required to achieve effective governance in order for African countries to be on the frontiers of sustainable economic growth and development in the 21st century if they hope to achieve the Agenda 2063 Goals. During the Golden Jubilee celebration of the formation of the Organization of African Unity (now African Union) in May 2013, African governments signed the Fiftieth Anniversary Solemn Declaration (FASD), which laid out the blueprint and master plan designed to transform Africa into the global super powerhouse of the future. The key research question is: If PESIs are the required pathways to success for African countries, how resilient and/or weak are the PESIs? This is an important research question because African countries need resilient PESIs in order to achieve the African Agenda 2063. To answer this vital research question, given the goals outlined in the FASD, this paper uses the six governance indicators developed by World Bank (2024) to construct three indexes: resilient political institutions (RPI) index, resilient economic institutions (REI) index, and resilient social institutions (RSI) index to access the resilience and the progress made to strengthen the PESIs in the aftermath of the FASD. To comprehend the intensity of RPI, REI, and RSI, we divide the 0 to 2.50 scores into three different categories: 0 to 0.83, 0.84 to 1.66, and 1.67 to 2.50 to indicate minimum, moderate, and maximum resilient PESIs, respectively. In contrast, we use the 0 to -2.50 scores to evaluate the degree of no resilient PESIs in African countries by dividing the scores into three categories: 0 to -0.83, -0.84 to -1.66, and -1.67 to -2.50 to indicate weak, weaker, and weakest resilient PESIs, respectively. In addition, we use the difference-in-means statistical method to evaluate the progress made by comparing the pre- and post-FASD periods. The data and estimated results show that 48 out of 54 African countries are located in weak and weaker pathways with respect to their PESIs in the aftermath of the FASD. The overwhelming weak PESIs pose the biggest challenge to achieving the African Agenda 2063; therefore, African countries should focus on building resilient PESIs between now and 2063.

KEYWORDS: Vital Institutions, Resilience, Economic, Political, Social, Unique Indexes

1. INTRODUCTION

The resilience of vital institutions are fundamental to effective and productive governance because both are necessary in achieving long-term sustainable economic growth and development. Over the past three or more decades, many economists such as North (1990), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), Rodrick, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002), Easterly and Levine (2002) have emphasized the importance of institutions as some of the key determinants of economic growth and development outcomes in developed and less developed countries. Other economists, such as Bloom and Sachs (1998), Sachs (2002a, 2002b, 2003a, and 2003b), Démurger *et al.* (2002) have questioned the validity of the primacy of institutions as the fundamental determinant of economic growth and better development outcomes. Given the debate about the role institutions in economic growth and development, it is obvious that there are many factors that can contribute to sustainable growth and development and that institutions provide another dimension, which economists can no longer ignore. The paper therefore considers the political, economic, and social institutions as the tripartite institutions that are the required coordinators of all the necessary factors needed to achieve long-term sustainable economic growth and development.

This paper contributes to the literature by examining the resilience of the political, economic, and social institutions (PESIs) in 54 African countries in the aftermath of the Fiftieth Anniversary Solemn Declaration (FASD) in 2013. During the Golden Jubilee celebration of the formation of the Organization of African Unity in May 2013, African governments signed the FASD in which the 54 African countries laid out the blueprint and master plan designed to transform Africa into the global super powerhouse of the future. For Africa to build a better future and transform into the global super powerhouse of the future, the tripartite PESIs in each African country must be robustly resilient to handle all future national and global shocks. This paper therefore provides the empirical framework with which to assess whether the vital PESIs are resilience enough now and into the near future because of the strong

relationship between institutions and economic development [North (1990), Rodrik (1999), Rodrik (2000), Rodrik *et al.* (2002), Pande and Udry (2005), Shirley (2005), and Bardhan (2006)].

To provide the empirical work, this paper utilizes the six governance indicators developed by World Bank (2024) to construct three unique indexes of resilience: (a) the resilient political institutions (RPI) index, (b) the resilient economic institutions (REI) index, and (c) the resilient social institutions (RSI) index to access the progress made in the aftermath of the FASD. To comprehend the RPI, REI, and RSI in all 54 African countries, we consider the 0 to 2.50 scores as the *resilience location*, and to understand the intensity the resilience, we use the 0 to 2.50 scores to divide the *resilience location* into three different pathways. First, the 0 to 0.83 scores indicate minimum resilience pathway of the PESIs (RPI, REI, and RSI). Second, the 0.84 to 1.66 scores signify moderate resilience pathway of the RPI, REI, and RSI. Third, the 1.67 to 2.50 scores signal the maximum resilience pathway for the PESIs in the *resilience location*. In contrast, we consider the 0 to –2.5 scores as indicative of the *nonresilience location*; and to evaluate the degree of nonresilience of the PESIs in all African countries while in the *nonresilience location*, we also divide the 0 to –2.5 scores into three categories or pathways. The 0 to –0.83 indicate weak pathway for PESIs. Next, the –0.84 to –1.66 scores signal weaker pathway for PESI. The –1.67 to –2.5 scores represent the weakest pathway for PESIs in the *nonresilience location*.

Based on the computed RPI, REI, and RSI, we provide a graphical illustration to show the locations of African countries in the *resilience* and/or *nonresilience* locations throughout the sample period. We observe that 48 African countries (88.9%) are crowded in the weak pathway of the *nonresilience location*. Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, and South are the six African countries that one can find in the minimum pathway in the resilience location throughout the sample period. Next, we utilize the difference-in-means (DIM) estimation method to provide the statistical assessments and identifications of which African countries made progress in strengthening the resilience of their vital tripartite PESIs since they signed the FASD in 2013. The estimated DIM results show that some African countries made minor improvements while still in the *weak pathway* of the *nonresilience location*. More importantly, the estimated results indicate that the overwhelming majority of African countries are farther away from building the robust resilient PESIs needed to achieve the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the African Agenda 2063 Goals.¹

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide a review of studies that have examined the relationship between institutions and sustainable economic growth and development outcomes. Section 3 provides the trends in the resilience and/or nonresilience of the tripartite PESIs over the sample period. Section 4 provides the estimated results based on the difference-in-means method used to measure the resilience and nonresilience outcomes. The paper concludes in section 5 with some implications of the resilience and/or nonresilience of PESIs.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Prior to the 1990s, different schools of thought in economics emphasized the importance of climate, geography, resource endowments, and trade openness in achieving sustainable economic growth and development. Over the past three decades, the role of institutions has become one of the most popular research areas in development economics, and despite the recognition that “institutions matter” for development, the nature of the relationship is still debated and contested. In other words, there is no general consensus about the role of institutions in economic growth and development. According to North (1981, 1990), “institutions are the rules of the game in a society, or more formally, are the human devised constraints that shape human interaction” in many aspects of political, economics, and social organization of society.

Studies by Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu *et al.* (2001) provided cross-country empirical analyses that strongly support the overwhelming importance of institutions in predicting the level of development in countries around the world [Djankov *et al.* (2002)]. The new institutional economics gained prominence when Rodrik *et al.* (2002) highlighted the primacy of institutions relative to geography and trade openness in determining the differences in income between the developed countries and the less developed countries around the world. Rodrik *et al.* (2002) found that institutional determinants outweigh all other determinants in explaining income differences around the world. Sachs (2003a) challenged the validity of the primacy of institutions in explaining economic growth and development. In both studies, Sachs (2003a, 2003b) agreed that good institutions certainly matter, but not for everything and that institutions do not rule. Sachs (2003a) warned that “bad institutions can sound the death knell of development even in favorable environments;” therefore, growth theorists should not underestimate the role of geography and resource endowments as key determinants of economic growth.

Over the past two decades, a plethora of studies have highlighted the cross-country differences in economic, political, and social institutions. According to Acemoglu *et al.* (2001, 2002), Acemoglu (2008), and Acemoglu and Robinson (2010), institutions can differ between societies because of their formal methods of collective deciding making within their economic institutions and the distribution of political power, which lies with different groups or social classes. To highlight the impact of institutions in shaping the direction of economic growth and development, Acemoglu *et al.* (2001, 2002) provided some historical documentary evidence that the European colonizers set up different categories of institutions in different colonies, which later shaped the directions of their

¹ See Appendix A for the African Agenda 2063 Goals linked to 2030 Sustainable Development Goals.

economic growth. For example, in a large number of colonies, such as Africa, Central America, the Caribbean, and South Asia, the European colonizers set up the “extractive institutions,” designed to oppress the native population and with the intention to extract the natural resources from these colonies to the European homeland. Simply put, these colonies inherited extractive institutions, which may explain the lingering extractions in these colonies in the aftermath of colonization.

Acemoglu *et al.* (2001) pointed out that in other colonized countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States, the Europeans colonizers settled in large numbers, and in the process, they established non-extractive institutions that emphasized the enforcement of property rights for a broad section of the society. According to Acemoglu *et al.* (2001, 2002), the establishment of different institutions in different colonies, based on the European’s colonization strategy, may explain why some countries in these former colonies still remained poor today. In other words, many countries in these colonies inherited dysfunctional institutions or nonresilience institutions from which they have not recovered while some have managed to build strong and resilient institutions, which are strongly correlated to economic growth and development. In emphasizing the role of institutions in growth and development, Acemoglu and Johnson (2010) posed an empirical research question: “if institutions have such a large effect on economics riches, why do some societies choose, end up with, and maintain those dysfunctional institutions?”

3. TRENDS IN THE RESILIENCE AND NONRESILIENCE OF VITAL INSTITUTIONS IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES

In this section, we examine the trends in the resilience and/or nonresilience of the political, economic, and social institutions in African countries, which can be measured by the six governance indicators developed by the World Bank. The resilience of the political institutions (RPI) can be assessed using voice and accountability (*VA*) and political stability and absence of violence (*PV*) scores. In addition, the resilience of economic institutions (REI) can be measured by using government effectiveness (*GE*) and regulatory quality (*RQ*) scores, and the resilience of social institutions (RSI) can be evaluated by the rule of law (*RL*) and control of corruption (*CC*) scores. To put everything succinctly, we construct three unique RPI, REI, and RSI indexes as:

$$RPI\ Index = \frac{1}{2} (VA + PV) \quad (1),$$

$$REI\ Index = \frac{1}{2} (GE + RQ) \quad (2),$$

and

$$RSI\ Index = \frac{1}{2} (RL + CC) \quad (3).$$


These indexes cover the pre- and post-FASD period. Applying the same scores provided by the World Bank as the guideline, African countries with scores between 0 to 2.50 for *RPI*, *REI*, and *RSI* are classified as having resilient institutions while those African countries with scores ranging between 0 and –2.50 are deemed to have dysfunctional or nonresilient institutions.

To show the variations in the resiliency of three vital institutions in 54 African countries, we divide the 0 to 2.50 scores into three categories. African countries with scores ranging between 0 and 0.83 are deemed to have minimum resilient institutions, those African countries with scores between 0.84 and 1.66 are considered to have moderate resilient institutions, and those African countries with scores between 1.67 and 2.50 are viewed to have the maximum resilient institutions. In contrast, we divide the 0 to –2.5 scores into three categories to show the varying degrees of nonresilient institutions. African countries with scores between 0 and –0.83 are considered as those with weak nonresilient institutions, those African countries with scores between –0.84 and –1.66 are plagued with weaker nonresilient institutions, and those African countries with scores between –1.67 and –2.5 are considered to have the weakest nonresilient or dysfunctional institutions.

As Figure 1 shows, there are only six African countries: Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Seychelles, and South Africa that have minimum resilient economic, political, and social institutions. In addition, Benin, Ghana, and Sao Tome and Principe have minimum resilient political institutions while their economic and social institutions are in the weak pathway of the nonresilience location. For these three countries, this may imply absence of collaboration. More importantly, the overwhelming majority of African countries are crowded in the weak and weaker pathways of the nonresilience location. The two African countries with the weakest nonresilient political, economic, and social institutions are Somalia and South Sudan. As we can see in Figure 1, not a single African country is near the mid-range of the moderate resilient political, economic, and social institutions pathways talk less of being close to the maximum resilient pathway. In other words, no African country is close to the maximum resilient political, economic, and social institutions. This means African countries face enormous challenges in achieving sustainable economic growth and development in the 21st century. The take away lesson based on the observed trends in the resilience and/or nonresilience of their political, economic, and social institutions is that African countries may not be able to achieve its Agenda 2063 if we have only 11 percent of African countries with resilient institutions and the remaining 89 percent of the countries remain crowded in the weak and weaker weakest pathways in the nonresilience location. Given that the overwhelming majority of African countries remain crowded in the weak, weaker, and weakest pathways while in the nonresilience location, the pertinent research questions are: How many African countries transitioned from the nonresilience location with respect to these institutions into the resilience location since the FASD, which laid out the blueprint and master plan designed to transform Africa into the global super

powerhouse? Or Are African countries building resilient PESIs needed to achieve the Africa Agenda since the FASD in 2013? Or Are the PESIs more or less resilient/nonresilient in the aftermath of signing the FASD in 2013

Figure 1: Trends in the Resilience of Political, Economic, and Social Institutions in African Countries



Source: Constructed by the author based on the estimated RPI, REI, and RSI indexes, using the available data covering the 1996-2025 period.

EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT

In this section, we utilize the difference-in-means (DIM) statistical method to provide answers to those pertinent research questions as to whether any of the 54 African countries transitioned into the minimum, moderate, and maximum pathways in the resilience location since all the countries signed on to the FASD in 2013. In the FASD, African countries laid out the blueprint and master plan designed to transform Africa into the global super powerhouse of the future. The DIM² estimator method is commonly used in economics and other social sciences as the summary statistics in meta-analysis when measuring outcomes made on the same scale of variables over a period of time, normally before and after.

The estimated data for *RPI*, *REI*, and *RSI* indexes cover 14 years before FASD (period 1) and 10 years after FASD (period 2); therefore, the DIM assessment of the *RPI*, *REI*, and *RSI* can be written in three separate sets of null hypotheses (H_0) and alternative hypotheses (H_A) for each of the 54 African countries in our sample. That is:

$$(a) \quad H_0 : \overline{RPI}_{p2} = \overline{RPI}_{p1} \text{ versus } H_A : \overline{RPI}_{p2} \neq \overline{RPI}_{p1},$$

$$(b) \quad H_0 : \overline{REI}_{p2} = \overline{REI}_{p1} \text{ versus } H_A : \overline{REI}_{p2} \neq \overline{REI}_{p1},$$

and

$$(c) \quad H_0 : \overline{RSI}_{p2} = \overline{RSI}_{p1} \text{ versus } H_A : \overline{RSI}_{p2} \neq \overline{RSI}_{p1}.$$

To find the mean with which to test the changes both in the first period (subscript p_1) and second period (subscript p_2), we let ΣRPI_{p1} and ΣRPI_{p2} ; ΣREI_{p1} and ΣREI_{p2} ; and ΣRSI_{p1} and ΣRSI_{p2} be the sums of each computed index in both periods. The difference (D) for each index are $D|_{RPI} = RPI_{p2} - RPI_{p1}$, $D|_{REI} = REI_{p2} - REI_{p1}$, and $D|_{RSI} = RSI_{p2} - RSI_{p1}$ while $D^2|_{RPI}$ and $\Sigma D^2|_{RPI}$, $D^2|_{REI}$ and $\Sigma D^2|_{REI}$, and $D^2|_{RSI}$ and $\Sigma D^2|_{RSI}$ are the square difference and the sum of the square difference, respectively.

To make meaningful comparison between two periods spanning 24 years, we estimate the standard deviations, the standard errors, and the t -values, respectively as:

$$S_{D_{RPI}} = \sqrt{\frac{1}{N} \sum D_{RPI}^2 - (\Delta \overline{RPI})^2}; S_{D_{REI}} = \sqrt{\frac{1}{N} \sum D_{REI}^2 - (\Delta \overline{REI})^2}; \text{ and } S_{D_{RSI}} = \sqrt{\frac{1}{N} \sum D_{RSI}^2 - (\Delta \overline{RSI})^2} \quad (4),$$

$$S_{\overline{D}_{RPI}} = \frac{S_{D_{RPI}}}{\sqrt{N-1}}, S_{\overline{D}_{REI}} = \frac{S_{D_{REI}}}{\sqrt{N-1}}, \text{ and } S_{\overline{D}_{RSI}} = \frac{S_{D_{RSI}}}{\sqrt{N-1}} \quad (5),$$

and

$$t_{RPI} = \frac{\Delta \overline{RPI}}{S_{\overline{D}_{RPI}}}, t_{REI} = \frac{\Delta \overline{REI}}{S_{\overline{D}_{REI}}}, \text{ and } t_{RSI} = \frac{\Delta \overline{RSI}}{S_{\overline{D}_{RSI}}} \quad (6)$$

for each of the 54 African countries in the sample given the degree of freedom as $df = N - 2$. The results for the tests of the H_0 and H_A hypotheses for resilience and nonresilience of political institutions (*RPI*) are reported in Tables 1. Based on the estimated t -values reported in the last column of Table 1, we confirm the null hypothesis (that is, $H_0 : \overline{RPI}_{p2} = \overline{RPI}_{p1}$) of no difference in the resilience and nonresilience of political institutions between both periods (p_2 and p_1) in 24 out of 54 African countries. In contrast, we reject the H_0 in favor of the alternative hypotheses (that is, $H_A : \overline{RPI}_{p2} \neq \overline{RPI}_{p1}$) in 30 African countries. Among this group of 30 African countries, 14 of them experienced minor improvements while in the weak and/or weaker pathways of the nonresilience location (see Figure 1); and only Ghana showed minor improvement while in the minimum resilience pathway for *RPI*. For the remaining 16 African countries in the group of 30, the nonresilience of their political institutions actually worsened or weakened more in the second period (p_2) in comparison to the first period (p_1).

The results for the H_0 and H_A hypotheses for resilience of economic institutions (*REI*) are

² For more about the difference-in-differences or the difference-in-means method, see Athey and Imbens (2006, 2017), Stock and Watson (2019), Wooldridge (2016), Lechner (2011), and Bertrand *et al.* (2004).

Table 1. Resilience of Political Institutions in African Countries in the 21st Century

	Countries	$\overline{RPI}_{P2}$	S^2_{P2}	$\overline{RPI}_{P1}$	S^2_{P1}	$\Delta \overline{RPI}$	<i>t</i> -value
1.	Algeria	-0.97	0.00	-1.19	0.04	0.22	3.33*
2.	Angola	-0.71	0.01	-1.12	0.18	0.41	2.96*
3.	Benin	-0.01	0.06	0.39	0.02	-0.40	-4.98*
4.	Botswana	0.75	0.00	0.81	0.00	-0.06	-2.56*
5.	Burkina Faso	-0.63	0.05	-0.22	0.02	-0.41	-5.39*
6.	Burundi	-1.46	0.08	-1.43	0.12	-0.03	-0.20
7.	Cape Verde	0.88	0.01	0.86	0.01	0.02	0.57
8.	Cameroon	-1.14	0.04	-0.79	0.01	-0.35	-5.69*
9.	Central African Republic	-1.63	0.03	-1.32	0.05	-0.36	-4.36*
10.	Chad	-1.35	0.01	-1.35	0.05	-0.00	0.03
11.	Comoros	-0.35	0.05	-0.40	0.07	-0.05	0.45
12.	Congo, Democratic Republic	-1.69	0.03	-1.88	0.04	0.19	2.54*
13.	Congo, Republic of the	-0.82	0.02	-1.00	0.05	0.18	2.18*
14.	Côte d'Ivoire	-0.65	0.01	-1.25	0.19	0.60	4.17*
15.	Djibouti	-0.92	0.01	-0.64	0.03	-0.28	-4.46*
16.	Egypt	-1.31	0.00	-0.85	0.05	0.46	-6.10*
17.	Equatorial Guinea	-1.02	0.01	-0.85	0.01	-0.17	-4.27*
18.	Eritrea	-1.45	0.00	-1.35	0.03	-0.10	-1.79
19.	Eswatini (former Swaziland)	-0.85	0.01	-0.74	0.01	-0.11	-3.02*
20.	Ethiopia	-1.40	0.02	-1.31	0.05	-0.09	-1.14
21.	Gabon	-0.48	0.01	-0.21	0.02	-0.27	-5.15*
22.	Gambia	-0.35	0.12	-0.35	0.04	0.00	0.02
23.	Ghana	0.27	0.00	0.11	0.03	0.16	2.59*
24.	Guinea	-0.83	0.03	-1.34	0.09	0.51	4.76*
25.	Guinea-Bissau	-0.61	0.05	-0.79	0.08	0.18	1.61
26.	Kenya	-0.69	0.00	-0.78	0.01	0.09	2.54*
27.	Lesotho	-0.07	0.01	-0.01	0.02	-0.06	-1.07
28.	Liberia	-0.27	0.02	-1.03	0.32	0.76	4.14*
29.	Libya	-1.83	0.03	-0.92	0.08	-0.91	-8.90*
30.	Madagascar	-0.41	0.02	-0.22	0.18	-0.19	-1.43
31.	Malawi	-0.10	0.01	-0.15	0.01	0.05	1.37
32.	Mali	-1.20	0.08	0.07	0.18	-1.27	-8.33*
33.	Mauritania	-0.75	0.01	-0.56	0.12	-0.19	-1.68
34.	Mauritius	0.84	0.01	0.89	0.01	-0.05	-1.68
35.	Morocco	-0.50	0.00	-0.47	0.04	-0.03	-0.56
36.	Mozambique	-0.64	0.07	0.06	0.02	-0.70	-8.81*
37.	Namibia	0.60	0.00	0.53	0.05	0.07	1.04
38.	Niger	-0.87	0.02	-0.49	0.09	-0.35	-3.60*
39.	Nigeria	-1.22	0.01	-1.25	0.03	0.03	0.51
40.	Rwanda	-0.55	0.01	-1.14	0.14	0.59	4.81*
41.	Sao Tome and Principe	0.32	0.01	0.36	0.06	-0.04	-0.42
42.	Senegal	0.07	0.00	-0.16	0.02	0.23	4.34*
43.	Seychelles	0.48	0.02	0.48	0.01	-0.00	0.01
44.	Sierra Leone	-0.14	0.00	-0.59	0.27	0.45	2.70*
45.	Somalia	-2.18	0.02	-2.31	0.07	0.13	1.46
46.	South Africa	0.19	0.01	0.27	0.00	-0.08	-2.42*
47.	South Sudan†	-2.04	0.04	-1.26	0.00	-0.78	-5.62*
48.	Sudan	-1.85	0.03	-1.98	0.03	0.13	1.70
49.	Tanzania	-0.41	0.01	-0.34	0.05	-0.07	-0.94
50.	Togo	-0.66	0.03	-0.73	0.04	0.07	0.94
51.	Tunisia	-0.35	0.01	-0.49	0.03	0.09	1.58
52.	Uganda	-0.72	0.01	-0.91	0.04	0.19	2.93*
53.	Zambia	-0.07	0.02	-0.02	0.03	-0.05	-0.79
54.	Zimbabwe	-0.98	0.00	-1.21	0.07	0.23	2.71*

Source: Estimated results based on World Bank's (2025) data.

Summary: Statistical significance in 30 countries (minor improvements in 14 countries, worsened in 16 countries) and remained unchanged in 24 countries.

Table 2. Resilience of Economics Institutions in African Countries in the 21st Century

	Countries	$\overline{REI}_{P2}$	S^2_{P2}	$\overline{REI}_{P1}$	S^2_{P1}	$\Delta \overline{REI}$	t-value
1.	Algeria	-0.87	0.00	-0.72	0.03	-0.15	-2.73*
2.	Angola	-0.99	0.01	-1.21	0.04	0.22	3.33*
3.	Benin	-0.45	0.01	-0.41	0.03	-0.04	-0.76
4.	Botswana	0.45	0.00	0.58	0.01	-0.13	-3.69*
5.	Burkina Faso	-0.52	0.01	-0.43	0.01	-0.09	-2.48*
6.	Burundi	-1.08	0.01	-1.26	0.03	0.18	2.93*
7.	Cape Verde	0.02	0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.03	0.78
8.	Cameroon	-0.85	0.00	-0.83	0.01	-0.02	-0.40
9.	Central African Republic	-1.57	0.00	-1.28	0.01	-0.29	-7.10*
10.	Chad	-1.31	0.00	-1.11	0.05	-0.20	-2.60*
11.	Comoros	-1.38	0.01	-1.46	0.04	0.08	1.22
12.	Congo, Democratic Republic	-1.52	0.01	-1.63	0.03	0.11	1.87
13.	Congo, Republic of the	-1.25	0.01	-1.21	0.01	-0.04	-1.31
14.	Côte d'Ivoire	-0.50	0.03	-0.87	0.09	-0.37	3.56*
15.	Djibouti	-0.80	0.00	-0.79	0.01	-0.01	-0.34
16.	Egypt	-0.62	0.07	-0.37	0.01	-0.25	-3.15*
17.	Equatorial Guinea	-1.43	0.00	-1.40	0.01	0.03	0.71
18.	Eritrea	-1.95	0.00	-1.42	0.15	-0.53	-4.17*
19.	Eswatini (former Swaziland)	-0.59	0.01	-0.60	0.02	0.01	0.23
20.	Ethiopia	-0.81	0.00	-0.87	0.04	0.06	1.05
21.	Gabon	-0.81	0.01	-0.49	0.05	-0.32	-4.13*
22.	Gambia	-0.65	0.01	-0.51	0.01	-0.14	-3.58*
23.	Ghana	-0.13	0.00	-0.08	0.02	-0.05	-1.11
24.	Guinea	-0.96	0.01	-1.01	0.04	0.05	0.84
25.	Guinea-Bissau	-1.39	0.00	-1.12	0.01	-0.27	-8.83*
26.	Kenya	-0.36	0.01	-0.40	0.00	0.04	1.42
27.	Lesotho	-0.55	0.04	-0.39	0.02	-0.16	-2.37*
28.	Liberia	-1.15	0.00	-1.45	0.07	0.30	3.44*
29.	Libya	-1.97	0.02	-1.27	0.02	-0.70	-11.24*
30.	Madagascar	-0.93	0.00	-0.54	0.04	-0.39	-6.17*
31.	Malawi	-0.73	0.00	-0.50	0.02	-0.23	-4.64*
32.	Mali	-0.82	0.01	-0.60	0.01	-0.22	-6.67*
33.	Mauritania	-0.82	0.01	-0.47	0.12	-0.35	-3.04*
34.	Mauritius	0.98	0.00	0.63	0.06	0.35	4.61*
35.	Morocco	-0.14	0.00	-0.14	0.01	-0.00	0.01
36.	Mozambique	-0.71	0.01	-0.47	0.01	-0.24	-5.49*
37.	Namibia	0.03	0.00	0.16	0.01	-0.13	-3.54*
38.	Niger	-0.69	0.00	-0.68	0.02	-0.01	-0.15
39.	Nigeria	-0.97	0.01	-0.96	0.01	-0.01	-0.03
40.	Rwanda	0.14	0.00	-0.55	0.14	0.69	5.75*
41.	Sao Tome and Principe	-0.78	0.00	-0.69	0.01	-0.09	-2.60*
42.	Senegal	-0.21	0.01	-0.25	0.02	0.04	0.85
43.	Seychelles	0.19	0.03	-0.14	0.06	0.33	3.73*
44.	Sierra Leone	-1.03	0.00	-1.15	0.03	0.12	2.18*
45.	Somalia	-2.16	0.01	-2.26	0.03	0.10	1.16
46.	South Africa	0.19	0.03	0.55	0.02	-0.36	-5.61*
47.	South Sudan‡	-2.09	0.05	-1.65	0.03	-0.44	-2.60*
48.	Sudan	-1.55	0.00	-1.28	0.01	-0.27	-7.70*
49.	Tanzania	-0.59	0.01	-0.47	0.00	-0.12	-3.46*
50.	Togo	-0.86	0.03	-1.04	0.04	0.18	2.19*
51.	Tunisia	-0.24	0.02	0.18	0.02	-0.42	-7.72*
52.	Uganda	-0.44	0.00	-0.31	0.01	-0.13	-3.61*
53.	Zambia	-0.52	0.02	-0.65	0.01	0.13	2.50*
54.	Zimbabwe	-1.40	0.01	-1.46	0.19	0.06	0.38

Source: Estimated results based on World Bank's (2025) data.

Summary: Statistical significance in 35 countries (minor improvements in 10 countries, worsened in 25 countries) and remained unchanged in 19 countries.

reported in Table 2. We confirm the null hypothesis ($H_0 : \overline{REI}_{P2} = \overline{REI}_{P1}$) of no difference in both periods in 19 African countries. In contrast, we reject the H_0 in favor of the alternative hypotheses ($H_A : \overline{REI}_{P2} \neq \overline{REI}_{P1}$) in 35 African

countries. Among these 35 countries, the nonresilience of the economic institutions actually worsened/weakened in 25 countries while the remaining 10 African countries (Angola, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Zambia) in the group experienced some improvements while in the nonresilient location. While Rwanda and Seychelles transitioned from the weak pathway of the nonresilient location to the minimum resilient location with respect to their economic institutions, Mauritius actually transitioned from minimum to moderate pathway.

Finally, the results for the tests of the H_0 and H_A hypotheses for the resilience of social institutions (RSI) are reported in Table 3. We confirm the null hypothesis ($H_0 : \overline{RSI}_{P2} = \overline{RSI}_{P1}$) of no difference in both periods in 25 African countries. In contrast, we reject the H_0 in favor of the alternative hypotheses ($H_A : \overline{RSI}_{P2} \neq \overline{RSI}_{P1}$) in 29 African countries. Among these 29 countries, the estimated results showed that the nonresilience of social institutions actually worsened or weakened in 18 countries while the remaining 11 African countries (Angola, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, and Togo) achieved some *minor* improvements. For example, Rwanda was somewhere in the midway within the weak pathway of the nonresilience location prior to the FASD in 2013 but managed to transition into almost the midway of the minimum pathway in the resilience location in the aftermath of the FASD in 2013. While Seychelles was at the bottom of the minimum pathway in the resilience location prior to 2013, it transitioned above halfway of the minimum pathway after 2013. What is obvious from these estimated results is that the six African countries (Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles and South Africa – see Figure 1), that exhibited minimum resilient PESIs

Table 3. Resilience of Social Institutions in African Countries in the 21st Century

	Countries	$\overline{RSI}_{P2}$	S^2_{P2}	$\overline{RSI}_{P1}$	S^2_{P1}	$\Delta \overline{RSI}$	t-value
1.	Algeria	-0.71	0.00	-0.73	0.02	0.02	0.40
2.	Angola	-1.10	0.04	-1.37	0.01	0.27	4.50*
3.	Benin	-0.51	0.01	-0.51	0.02	0.00	0.01
4.	Botswana	0.65	0.01	0.80	0.01	-0.15	-4.27*
5.	Burkina Faso	-0.34	0.01	-0.35	0.00	0.01	0.12
6.	Burundi	-1.34	0.01	-1.11	0.01	-0.23	-5.80*
7.	Cape Verde	0.68	0.00	0.66	0.03	0.02	0.29
8.	Cameroon	-1.10	0.00	-1.1	0.01	0.04	1.25
9.	Central African Republic	-1.47	0.00	-1.24	0.02	-0.23	-5.66*
10.	Chad	-1.36	0.00	-1.37	0.02	0.01	0.23
11.	Comoros	-0.98	0.04	-0.95	0.01	-0.03	-0.53
12.	Congo, Democratic Republic	-1.55	0.01	-1.57	0.02	0.02	0.38
13.	Congo, Republic of the	-1.20	0.00	-1.18	0.01	-0.02	-0.62
14.	Côte d'Ivoire	-0.56	0.01	-1.09	0.06	0.53	6.37*
15.	Djibouti	-0.82	0.01	-0.72	0.02	-0.10	-2.11*
16.	Egypt	-0.56	0.00	-0.37	0.02	-0.19	-4.48*
17.	Equatorial Guinea	-1.54	0.01	-1.42	0.01	-0.12	-3.41*
18.	Eritrea	-1.39	0.01	-0.58	0.17	-0.81	-5.96*
19.	Eswatini (former Swaziland)	-0.43	0.02	-0.45	0.02	0.02	0.31
20.	Ethiopia	-0.48	0.00	-0.74	0.01	0.26	8.20*
21.	Gabon	-0.74	0.01	-0.68	0.03	-0.06	-1.11
22.	Gambia	-0.53	0.03	-0.44	0.03	-0.09	-1.31
23.	Ghana	-0.05	0.00	-0.09	0.01	0.04	1.25
24.	Guinea	-1.11	0.00	-1.19	0.02	0.08	1.63
25.	Guinea-Bissau	-1.41	0.00	-1.26	0.01	-0.15	-3.65*
26.	Kenya	-0.67	0.01	-0.96	0.01	0.29	8.41*
27.	Lesotho	-0.18	0.02	-0.04	0.01	-0.14	-2.96*
28.	Liberia	-0.86	0.01	-1.18	0.19	0.32	2.25*
29.	Libya	-1.65	0.01	-1.03	0.01	-0.62	-13.02*
30.	Madagascar	-0.89	0.01	-0.42	0.04	-0.47	-7.10*
31.	Malawi	-0.47	0.01	-0.31	0.01	-0.10	-2.10*
32.	Mali	-0.78	0.01	-0.48	0.02	-0.30	-6.35*
33.	Mauritania	-0.78	0.01	-0.63	0.04	-0.15	-2.17*
34.	Mauritius	0.58	0.01	0.67	0.01	-0.09	-3.11*
35.	Morocco	-0.21	0.00	-0.18	0.03	-0.03	-0.69
36.	Mozambique	-0.87	0.01	-0.57	0.00	-0.30	-10.49*
37.	Namibia	0.29	0.00	0.28	0.02	0.01	0.26
38.	Niger	-0.60	0.00	-0.69	0.01	0.09	2.71*
39.	Nigeria	-1.03	0.01	-1.19	0.02	0.16	3.51*

The Pathways to Achieve the African Agenda 2063 Goals: Resilient Institutions

40.	Rwanda	0.35	0.00	-0.47	0.16	0.82	6.35*
41.	Sao Tome and Principe	-0.31	0.01	-0.29	0.06	-0.02	-0.20
42.	Senegal	-0.11	0.00	-0.21	0.04	0.10	1.66
43.	Seychelles	0.57	0.07	0.26	0.02	0.31	3.66*
44.	Sierra Leone	-0.72	0.02	-0.98	0.01	0.26	5.93*
45.	Somalia	-2.02	0.00	-1.95	0.04	-0.07	-1.12
46.	South Africa	0.00	0.01	0.25	0.02	-0.25	-5.08*
47.	South Sudan‡	-1.81	0.02	-1.19	0.10	-0.62	-4.91*
48.	Sudan	-1.31	0.00	-1.34	0.01	0.03	0.82
49.	Tanzania	-0.50	0.00	-0.48	0.01	-0.02	-0.58
50.	Togo	-0.73	0.01	-0.90	0.01	0.17	3.98*
51.	Tunisia	-0.06	0.00	-0.10	0.02	0.04	0.84
52.	Uganda	-0.70	0.00	-0.67	0.00	-0.03	-1.19
53.	Zambia	-0.46	0.02	-0.51	0.01	0.05	1.01
54.	Zimbabwe	-1.31	0.01	-1.38	0.13	0.07	0.55

Source: Estimated results based on World Bank's (2025) data.

Summary: Statistical significance in 29 countries (minor improvement in 11 countries, worsened in 18 countries) and remained unchanged in 25 countries.

throughout the sample, are not on any solid foundation with respect to the resilience of their political, economic, and social institutions. Metaphorically, if these 54 African were to be graded the way college/university students are graded, the six African countries with minimum resilient institutions will earn a C– grade while the remaining 48 African countries will receive an F grade because they have dysfunctional nonresilience political, economic, and social institutions.

4. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This paper complements all the extant studies that have emphasized the importance of institutions in economic growth and development outcomes in less developed countries. The study examines the resilience and/or nonresilience of the political, economic, and social institutions. We construct three unique indexes – *RPI*, *REI*, and *RSI* – to measure the resilience and/or nonresilience of these vital institutions in all 54 African countries in the aftermath of the FASD in 2013. To show the trends with respect to the resilience and/or nonresilience or dysfunctional institutions in the 54 African countries in the aftermath of the FASD in 2013, we utilize the computed *RPI*, *REI*, and *RSI* to provide a simple graphical illustration where one can find the location of each of the 54 African countries. With respect to the resilience of the economic, political, and social institutions, we observe that only six African countries are consistently located in the minimum range or pathway of the resilience location while the remaining 48 African countries are crowded in the weak and dysfunctional pathway in the nonresilience location.

Based on the difference-in-difference statistical results, we also observe that none of the 48 African countries crowded in the weak and dysfunctional pathway in the nonresilience location made any remarkable transition from the dysfunctional nonresilience location to resilience location in the aftermath of FASD, which all the 54 African countries adopted in 2013. In terms of policy implications, it is obvious from these empirical results that the overwhelming majority of African countries face enormous institutional challenges, thus they need solid institutional reforms.

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APPENDIX

Agenda 2063 Goals

1. A high standard of living, quality of life and well-being for all citizens.
2. Well educated citizens and skills revolution underpinned by science, technology and innovation.
3. Healthy and well-nourished citizens.
4. Transformed economies
5. Modern agriculture for increased productivity and production.
6. Blue/ocean economy for accelerated economic growth.
7. Blue/ocean economy for accelerated economic growth.
8. A United Africa (Federal or Confederate).
9. Continental financial and monetary institutions established and functional.
10. World class infrastructure crisscrosses Africa
11. Democratic values, practices, universal principles of human rights, justice and the rule of law entrenched.
12. Capable institutions and transformative leadership in place.
13. Peace, security and stability is preserved.
14. A stable and peaceful Africa.
15. A fully functional and operational Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)
16. African cultural renaissance is pre-eminent.
17. Full gender equality in all spheres of life.
18. Engaged and empowered youth and children.
19. Africa as a major partner in global affairs and peaceful co-existence.
20. Africa takes full responsibility for financing her development Goals.

Source: [Linking Agenda 2063 and the SDGs | African Union](#)